Without Thorough Investigation, There Is No Risk Management
- tealbeltinfo
- Dec 5
- 4 min read

The Tai Po blaze demands a year-long independent inquiry—just as the Lamma Island disaster did.
(Up to the time of this writing, the death toll mounts to 159 with another 30 persons still missing)
Tragic Blaze
The recent catastrophic fire in Tai Po has not only left behind destroyed property and lost lives but has also ignited serious questions about accountability across Hong Kong’s public and private sectors. While the immediate response focused on rescue and relief, public attention has rapidly shifted toward how such a disaster was even possible in the first place.
More Time Needed for Investigation
Given the scale of destruction, the wide scope of impact, and the number of potentially responsible entities, any meaningful and trustworthy investigation must be independent and allowed sufficient time—at least one year—to be conducted thoroughly. This is not speculation, but grounded in historical precedent and the particular complexity and scope of the case.
Learning from the Lamma Island Ferry Disaster
To understand the time frame required, we can look back at the Lamma Island ferry disaster of 2012, where 39 people died following a collision between two vessels. That event, though tragic, was far more contained in scope—it involved two operators, limited physical evidence, and a clearly defined sequence of events.
Independent Commission of Inquiry
Despite the narrower scope of the Lamma Island Ferry Disaster, an independent Commission of Inquiry was established and required over a year to complete its investigation, gather testimony, analyze evidence, and deliver a detailed public report with recommendations. If a maritime incident of that scale required such a timeline, the Tai Po blaze—which touches on construction practices, regulatory oversight, utility systems, and residential safety—warrants at least the same level of thoroughness, if not more.
The Web of Related Parties: A Multi-Stakeholder Crisis
The Tai Po fire cannot be attributed to a single failure or individual. Instead, it reflects interwoven responsibilities across multiple sectors. Any attempt to investigate the incident will need to consider input, actions, or omissions from a wide range of stakeholders. Below is an enriched and organized list of related parties (not yet prioritized), though estimated —either potentially responsible for the incident, involved in mitigation, or affected by the outcomes:
1.Government Agencies / Public Bodies
Fire Services Department – Response time, system readiness, inspections
Buildings Department – Code compliance, unauthorized structures
Housing Department – Building safety and maintenance oversight
Health Department – Victim care and community health impact
Police – Investigative support, security, evidence gathering
Urban Planning & Licensing Authorities – Zoning, usage compliance, escape route planning
Workplace Safety & Labor Department – Unsafe modifications, illegal partitions, hazardous work practices
Engineering Department – Review of structural and system compliance
Legal System – Civil and criminal accountability, claims processing
Emergency Medical Services – First response efficiency, injury management
Forensic / Investigative Bodies – Technical analysis of fire origin and spread
2.Private Sector / Commercial Entities
Developer and Engineering Division – Design, construction, system installations
Contractors / Subcontractors – Execution of works, material usage, safety adherence
Material Certification Bodies – Validation of fire-resistant materials, wiring
Property Management / Estate Management – Fire system maintenance, tenant regulation
Architects / Engineers / Safety Consultants – Design responsibility and code compliance
Manufacturers / Suppliers of Materials – Supply of compliant or substandard materials
Electrical & Utility Companies – Electrical safety, potential equipment failure
Banks / Insurance Companies / Financial Institutions – Risk underwriting, claims processes
Commercial Banks – Financing of the development and possible due diligence gaps
3.Civic / Social Stakeholders
NGOs – Advocacy, victim support, relief coordination
Volunteers / Youth Groups – On-site assistance, first-response support
Media / YouTubers / News Outlets – Information dissemination, watchdog role
General Civilians / Community Members – Public safety concerns, impact witnesses
Tenants / Subtenants (especially if unauthorized users) – Possible role in illegal alterations or operations
Victims / Residents – The most directly affected; their experiences are central to the narrative
4.Legal / Financial Impacts
Loss of Income – Particularly for residents or businesses affected
Home & Health-Related Expenses – Long-term financial and psychological burden
Psychological Trauma – Mental health impact, often under-addressed
Civil Claims & Liability Disputes – Compensation and justice mechanisms
Settlement Processes – Mediation, negotiation, or litigation outcomes
5.Potential Corruption / Mismanagement Risks
Corruption / Rebates – Bribery, kickbacks in contract awards
Collusion – Between regulators and contractors or developers
Infiltration – Potential organized crime or grey-zone operations
6.Internal Management Committees
Building Management Committees (BMCs) – Oversight of safety systems, resident communication
Why This Web Demands Time
Each of these parties has:
Different documentation and records
Varying degrees of access to decision-making
Possible legal exposure or conflict of interest
Testimony or evidence relevant to the chain of events
Compiling and cross-verifying dozens of interrelated accounts—including site inspections, paper trails, verbal testimonies, and digital records—takes time. Ensuring non-interference, whistleblower protection, and the integrity of the process will also require robust mechanisms and procedural fairness.
If the investigation is rushed, the result risks being superficial, omitting root causes or failing to assign proper accountability.
The Case for Independence
Given that some government departments may be among the implicated parties, an internal review would be met with public skepticism. To maintain credibility, an independent investigation committee—comprised of neutral experts, technical professionals, legal advisors, and public representatives—must be empowered to lead the process.
If the independent committee has the authority, the following actions are reasonable expectation:
Subpoena documents and records
Call witnesses under oath
Conduct or commission technical inspections
Make policy recommendations and refer cases for prosecution where needed
Conclusion: Justice Takes Time
· The Tai Po blaze is not just a case of fire—it’s a mirror reflecting the interconnected risks in Hong Kong’s development, safety, and governance ecosystem. With so many lives affected and so many systems under scrutiny, the investigation must be done right, not fast.
· The precedent set by the Lamma Island ferry disaster makes it clear: when public safety and institutional accountability are at stake, a one-year timeline is the minimum needed for a comprehensive, trustworthy, and just investigation.
· Let us not rush through another tragedy. Let us investigate with the seriousness and thoroughness that the people of Hong Kong deserve.

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